Federal Criminal Sentencing: Some Measurement Issues With Application to Pre-Guideline Sentencing Disparity by Rhodes, William
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 81
Issue 4 Winter Article 12
Winter 1991
Federal Criminal Sentencing: Some Measurement
Issues With Application to Pre-Guideline
Sentencing Disparity
William Rhodes
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal
Justice Commons
This Criminology is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
William Rhodes, Federal Criminal Sentencing: Some Measurement Issues With Application to Pre-Guideline Sentencing Disparity, 81
J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1002 (1990-1991)
0091-4169/91/8 104-1002
THE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAw & CRIMINOLOGY Vol. 81, No. 4
Copyright @ 1991 by Northwestern University, School of Law Printed in U.S.A.
CRIMINOLOGY
FEDERAL CRIMINAL SENTENCING:





Regression analysis is often used to study sentencing decisions. This
paper presents a statistical model-a two-limit tobit model with heter-
oscedastic error terms-that is an improvement over techniques often
used to analyze sentencing decisions. This model is applied to the
sentences imposed on federal offenders convicted of bank robbery and
the distribution of cocaine. Results are used to motivate a discussion
of sentence disparity.
I. INTRODUCTION
The empirical analysis of sentencing practices is a frequent sub-
ject for social scientists. This predilection is understandable. Sen-
tencing occupies a prominent role in the criminal process;
furthermore, many, if not most, of the factors that affect sentencing
decisions are measurable, allowing social scientists to test hypothe-
ses that in other contexts are difficult to operationalize.
For example, analyses of sentencing patterns have been used
* Part of this work was performed while the author was a staff member of the United
States Sentencing Commission. The author would like to thank Michael Block, John
Lott, Candace McCoy, Luke Froeb, Cindy Alexander, Bruce Kobayashi, Scott Lyden, Liz
Phillips and anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments. The views expressed in
this paper are the author's and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States
Sentencing Commission or Abt Associates.
** William Rhodes is Senior Scientist at Abt Associates. Dr. Rhodes' research inter-
ests include the mathematical modeling of criminal behavior and the statistical analysis
of criminal justice activity. His current research focuses on drug abuse, drug law en-
forcement, AIDS and criminal justice modelling.
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both to construct sentencing guidelines' and to evaluate them once
they have been implemented.2 Analyses of sentencing patterns have
also been used to evaluate social interventions such as career crimi-
nal programs, bans on plea bargaining, and mandatory minimums
for gun-law violations.3 Finally, they have been used to test hypo-
theses about society and law, including the behavior of complex or-
ganizations, the presence of racial and sexual discrimination, and
the functionalist/conflict theories of law.4 Similarly, analyses of sen-
tencing practices have been incorporated into studies of plea
bargaining.5
This paper focuses on a related topic, sentence disparity. Sen-
tence disparity arises when similar offenders who have committed
the same crime receive different sentences, and when dissimilar of-
fenders who have committed different crimes receive the same sen-
tence-absent compelling justification for differences in the first
instance and similarity in the second. Sentence disparity has re-
ceived extended attention from researchers and critics of the judi-
cial process.6
In section two, we introduce the statistical model used in this
study to analyze sentence disparity. In sections three and four, we
use this model to estimate the average sentences imposed on bank
robbers and high-level dealers of cocaine conditional on the offense
characteristics (e.g., the dollar amount stolen and the amount of
drugs involved), the offender's background (including his criminal
record), and especially whether the offender pled guilty or was con-
victed after a trial. In section five, we go beyond this expectation to
I W. RICH, P. SuTrON, T. CLEAR & M. SAKS, SENTENCING GUIDELINES: THEIR OPERA-
TION AND IMPACT ON THE COURTS (1981) [hereinafter W. RICH]; UNITED STATES SENTENC-
ING COMMISSION, SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT ON THE INITIAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES (1987)
[hereinafter SENTENCING COMMISSION, SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT].
2 M. TONRY, SENTENCING REFORM IMPACTS (NIU Issues and Practices 1987) [herein-
after M. TONRY].
3 See A. BLUMSTEIN, J. COHEN, S. MARTIN & M. TONRY, RESEARCH ON SENTENCING:
THE SEARCH FOR REFORM (1983) [hereinafter A. BLUMSTEN]; M. TONRY, supra note 2.
4 See A. BLUMSTEIN, supra note 3.
5 W. McDONALD, PLEA BARGAINING: CRITICAL ISSUES AND COMMON PRACTICES (NIl
Research Report 1985); W. RHODES, PLEA BARGAINING: WHO GAINS? WHO LOSES (Prom-
ise Res. Pub. No. 14, 1979); A. RosErr & D. CRESSEY, JUSTICE BY CONSENT: PLEA BAR-
GAINS IN THE AMERICAN COURTHOUSE (1976); Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14
J. L. & ECON. 61 (1971).
6 See Albonetti, Race and the Probability of Pleading Guilty, 6J. QuANTITATIVE CRIM. 315
(1990); Spiegel & Templeman, Economics of Discriminatory Sentencing, 5 J. QuANTITATVE
CRIM. 317 (1989); A. BLUMSTEIN, supra note 3. In the federal courts, the locus of this
paper, we note the critique of Judge Frankel, see M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES
(1973), and the empirical work of Rhodes and Conly. See Rhodes & Conly, Analysis of
Federal Sentencing (Fed. Just. Res. Program, May 1981).
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examine more minutely the analytical meaning of the dispersion
about these conditional means before tying this examination to a
discussion of sentence disparity. Our analysis is based on sentences
imposed prior to the introduction of the federal sentencing guide-
lines, and much of our discussion compares preguideline sentencing
practices with the since implemented guidelines.
II. A STATISTICAL MODEL
When analyzing sentencing practices, researchers often use a
statistical model based on regression analysis. A generic version of
this model can be written:
T = 30 + 31Xi + 3 2X2 + ... + 3Xn +E
T is the sentence imposed, measured as prison months in this appli-
cation. According to this formula, a sentence is determined by mea-
surable factors, X1, X2 . . . Xn, and an unmeasurable (or at least
unmeasured) random factor, e. The unmeasured factor, F, is often
called the "residual term." The greek symbols 130, 13 , .. . 13n repre-
sent how much weight each of the measurable factors receives at the
time of sentencing. These weights, called "parameters," are esti-
mated from the data.
The statistical model used in this study departs from the ge-
neric model, which assumes that all judges impose sentences using
the same weights, 130, 13 . .. 3n, and that each judge uses the same
weights every time he or she imposes a sentence. Rich et al.7 and
others have argued that this assumption of homogenous parameters
across both judges and across sentencing decisions is unrealistic.
We agree, and in our modification of the generic model, we have
assumed that the parameters 130, J31 ... 13, are random. The task is to
determine the values of these parameters "on average."
One cost of adopting a random parameter model is that the sta-
tistical estimation procedure is complicated. In the generic model,
the residual term e is usually assumed to be normally distributed
with a mean of zero and a constant standard deviation of o. In our
approach, o is seen to vary, such that judges disagree more about
the sentences to be imposed on repeat offenders who commit the
most serious crimes than they do about first-time offenders who
commit the least serious crimes. A mathematical expression for this
assumption is written:
7 See W. RICH, supra note 1.
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cr = CE + ac(130 + PXI + 32X2 + ... + M3.X.)
This model is closer to reality than is the generic model, it is less
subject to the criticisms raised by Rich and colleagues, and-as we
explain later-it supports a richer interpretation of sentence
disparity.
Our approach departs from the generic model in another way.
The effect of a plea bargain on the sentence imposed is usually
modeled in one of two ways: either one of the X variables is used to
represent occurrence of a guilty plea, or two distinct models are es-
timated, one for sentences imposed after a trial and one for
sentences imposed after a guilty plea. Although we use both of
these standard approaches, we also use a third approach, in which
the sentence typically imposed after a trial is seen to be a multiple of
the sentence typically imposed after a guilty plea. This aspect of the
model can be represented:
T = (1+r)$IX + E
where t equals one when a trial occurs and zero otherwise, and r is
an additional parameter that requires estimation.
In a final departure from the generic model, we recognized
that, in our data set, sentences have a lower limit of zero (because
the dependent variable S was measured as length of a prison term)
and an upper limit of 360 months (a practical limit based on
preguideline parole eligibility). Thus, the estimation procedure had
to account for these upper and lower limits. We used a two-limit
tobit model, an estimation technique that is generally regarded as
suitable for such applications.8
As an overview, this model is a two-limit tobit model with heter-
oscedastic error terms (that is, o" varies systematically) and a multi-
plier term to reflect the consequences of plea bargaining. Details of
our statistical model are provided in a technical appendix. We now
turn to using this model to describe the preguideline sentencing
practices of federal judges.
III. ANALYSIS-BANK ROBBERY
Bank robbery is a unique crime among federal cases. 9 It is not
unlike that portrayed on television. Sometimes a bank robbery is
committed by an individual rather than by a group. When it is a
8 G. MADDALA, LIMITED-DEPENDENT AND QUALITATIVE VARIABLES IN ECONOMEMICS
(1983).
9 Bank Robbery, BUREAU JUST. STUD. BuLL. (Aug. 1984).
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group activity, roles are differentiated: some offenders are leaders
orjoint participants, others are subordinates, and still others are pe-
ripherally involved. Sometimes the offenders are armed; frequently
they are not (although the victim may not know this). Rarely is any-
one injured, although there are instances involving hostages, injury,
and even death. What makes the crime unique, however, is its high
probability of capture and its ease of conviction. These two features
are to be expected, since the crime is committed before witnesses,
captured on a camera, may trigger a silent alarm, and nets an ex-
ploding dye-pack along with the cash.
Its singular offense characteristics actually make bank robbery
an ideal offense to study. First, conviction is so likely (93% ofjury
trials resulted in convictions during 1985) that evidence probably
plays a secondary role during plea negotiations. The secondary role
of evidence is useful given the absence from our data of variables
about evidence. Second, a prison sentence is the usual punishment,
so it is unnecessary to develop a prison equivalent for other
sentences-probation, fines and restitution. Finally, our data in-
clude the major offense characteristics summarized in the previous
paragraph. 10
Variables used in the analysis are defined in Table 1. Descrip-
tive statistics are reported in Table 2. Between January 1, 1984 and
the middle of 1988, 5,168 offenders were convicted of bank robbery
and sentenced under preguideline laws.11 Columns 4 and 5 of Ta-
ble 2 pertain to 445 offenders who were convicted by jury trial. Col-
umns 2 and 3 pertain to the 3,697 offenders who pled guilty. A total
of 400 cases had unknown dispositions. Another 74 offenders, who
were convicted by bench trial, are not included in the statistics. 12
10 Data come from the FPSSIS information system, developed and maintained by the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts. The data contain over 95% of all
cases that resulted in conviction between January 1, 1984, and the middle of 1988.
These data are described in SENTENCING COMMISSION, SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT, Supra note
I.
S1I Defendants sentenced under the guidelines receive "real time" sentences, which
determine time served except for a potential 15% reduction for good-time credits. De-
fendants sentenced prior to the guidelines received maximum sentences, and typically,
only about one-third of the maximum term is served. The actual release date is deter-
mined by the Bureau of Prisons and the United States Parole Commission. Preguideline
and postguideline sentences cannot be compared directly, a fact that necessitated the
elimination of guideline cases. Furthermore, the guidelines have likely modified the fac-
tors entering the sentencing decision, or the weights those factors receive, or both. A
single structural equation could not be used to model both pre- and postguideline
sentences.
12 Defendants who are convicted by bench trials typically are sentenced more leni-




DEFINITIONS OF VARIABLES: ROBBERY
PRISON* The maximum prison sentence imposed, coded in months. Life
equals 999. "Partial months" are coded as 0.5.
AGGRAVAT Coded 1 when the probation officer indicated that aggravating
conditions existed; otherwise, coded zero.
MITIGATE Coded I when the probation officer indicated that mitigating
conditions existed; otherwise coded zero.
W-BRAN A firearm or other weapon was brandished or otherwise used (that
is, discharged if a firearm).
W-PRES A firearm or other weapon was present but was not brandished or
otherwise used.
MOREC In a group crime, the offender was more culpable than other
offenders.
EQUALC In a group crime, the offender was equally culpable.
LESSC In a group crime, the offender was less culpable.
CONVICTS The logarithm of the number of adult and juvenile convictions not
including the instant conviction for bank robbery. A one was
added to all variailes prior to taking logarithms.
INCLOW The logarithm of the number of prior prison terms of between 30
days and one year. A one was added to all variables before taking
logarithms.
INCI-5 The logarithm of the number of prior prison terms of between 1
and 5 years. A one was added to all variables before taking
logarithms.
INC-5 The logarithm of the number of prior prison terms of more than
five years. A one was added to all variables before taking
logarithms.
MULTIPLE "The current behavior was comprised of multiple acts, consisting
of a number of impulse or opportunity crimes (e.g. robberies
committed with little planning)". . . from the coding instructions.
CONTINUE "The current behavior was comprised of multiple recurrent acts
that were planned as a long-range scheme" ... from the coding
instructions.
SDOLLAR Logarithm of the amount of money stolen, when the crime was
described as being a single event. Equal to zero when not a single
event.
CDOLLAR Logarithm of the amount of money stolen, when the crime was
described as continuing. Equal to zero when not continuing.
MDOLLAR Logarithm of the amount of money stolen, when the crime was
described as multiple events. Equal to zero when not multiple
events.
Cl..Cl1 Circuit within which the sentence was imposed. The 11 th circuit
is the excluded circuit.
* As explained in the text, prison terms above 360 months were treated as being































































































We excluded 170 cases that involved victim injury.' 3 We further ex-
cluded 337 cases that reported no dollar loss, because dollar loss
was used as one measure of offense seriousness. A few other cases
were dropped due to missing data.
Inspection of the descriptive statistics reported in Table 2 indi-
cates that sentences typically were more severe following trials than
following guilty pleas. One explanation is that cases that are tried
tend to be more serious than those that result in guilty pleas. For
example, a trial is more likely when the defendant used a weapon,
Statistical Analysis of Sentencing in Federal Courts: Defendants Convicted After Trial, 4 J. LEGAL
STUDIES 369 (1975).
13 Victim injury is rare during a bank robbery, primarily because the offense takes
place in a controlled setting and bank employees are instructed to acquiesce to the rob-
ber's demands. When overt violence occurs, the crime is an exception, and sentencing
may follow a structural model that differs from the one analyzed here. We avoided the

































had an extensive criminal record, and exercised a leadership role.
However, a trial is also more likely when the defendant robbed only
one bank instead of several banks. 14
A second explanation is that people who enter guilty pleas re-
ceive more lenient sentences holding constant the seriousness of the
offense. Exploring this second explanation requires a regression
model, which we discussed earlier.
Table 3 reports regression results. Variables, which were de-
fined in Table 1, are identified in column 1. Column 2 pertains to
guilty pleas only and column 3 pertains to trials only. The fourth
column presents results for pleas and trials combined (with a
dummy variable added for a trial). The final column presents re-
sults for the multiplier model. T-scores (parameter estimates di-
vided by their standard errors) are reported in parentheses.
Focusing attention on the first two regressions, patterns emerge
from sentences imposed both after trials and after guilty pleas. As
expected, the length of the sentence increases with the severity of
the crime, the offender's responsibility for that crime, and the of-
fender's criminal record.
There is regional variation. Federal district courts are organ-
ized into circuits. The First and Second Circuits (Cl and C2) are
Northeastern: for example, Massachusetts is from the First Circuit
and New York Southern (Manhattan) is from the Second. The
Northeastern part of the nation is often characterized as imposing
relatively lenient sentences, 15 which is consistent with the large neg-
ative coefficients in table 3. The Ninth Circuit (which includes Cali-
fornia) also has a reputation for relative leniency, which is consistent
with the regression results.
Judges from the South are sometimes characterized as being
harsher than those in the rest of the country when sentencing. The
results are consistent. Sentences tend to be especially severe in the
Fourth (which extends from Maryland through the Carolinas) and
Fifth (which consists of Texas, Louisiana and Mississippi) Circuits.
The omitted region (which serves as a contrast) is the Eleventh Cir-
14 Perhaps this is because an acquittal is more likely when the case must be based on
a single episode; therefore, the defendant has an incentive to seek a trial.
15 The circuits contain heterogeneous districts. For example, the Southern District
of New York (Manhattan) has a caseload and legal culture that probably differs radically
from the Northern District of New York (Albany, other upstate cities, and rural areas),
although both districts are members of the second circuit. At best, use of circuit dummy
variables captures rough regional effects, leaving within-circuit variation unexplained.
We estimated models with districts substituted for circuits, drawing the data from the
eleven districts that prosecuted 99 or more cases. The resulting regressions indicated
considerable variation across the districts.
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Table 3
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR PLEAS AND TRIALS: ROBBERY
Guilty Plea Trial Both Multiplier
CONSTANT 40.46 58.45 32.81 37.24
( 4.15) ( 2.31) ( 3.55) ( 4.28)
AGGRAVAT 19.88 11.86 19.13 18.09
( 6.37) ( 1.13) ( 6.37) ( 6.24)
MITIGATE -15.99 42.70 -13.89 -13.08
(-3.82) ( 1.72) ( -3.34) ( -3.22)
W-BRAN 49.63 61.33 51.22 49.46
(17.70) ( 6.16) ( 18.76) ( 18.76)
W-PRES 36.28 46.20 36.56 35.65
( 11.65) ( 4.06) ( 12.08) ( 12.18)
MOREC 12.80 11.37 13.21 12.50
( 3.59) ( 1.11) ( 3.89) ( 3.86)
EQUALC 5.01 -26.69 2.69 2.25
( 1.04) ( -1.89) ( 0.58) ( 0.51)
LESSC -41.72 -73.63 -44.94 -43.63
(-11.70) ( 7.93) (-13.01) (-13.35)
INC-5 37.92 44.62 38.17 36.45
( 12.61) ( 5.10) ( 13.35) ( 13.26)
INCI-5 19.47 11.82 18.58 17.67
( 7.80) ( 1.55) ( 7.74) ( 7.66)
INCLOW -0.24 -15.83 -1.41 -1.61
(-0.10) ( -2.25) ( -0.62) ( -0.74)
CONVICTS 17.81 28.27 18.84 18.18
( 8.25) ( 4.09) ( 8.98) ( 9.02)
CONTINUE 17.56 -58.11 15.99 12.98( 0.87) ( -0.85) ( 0.84) ( 0.71)
MULTIPLE -20.25 -109.19 -16.72 -19.53
( -1.45) ( -1.06) ( -1.23) ( -1.47)
SDOLLAR 3.45 5.02 4.11 3.74( 3.18) ( 1.81) ( 4.00) ( 3.88)
CDOLLAR 6.35 17.95 7.32 7.19( 3.13) ( 2.59) ( 3.81) ( 3.91)
MDOLLAR 8.40 23.31 8.84 8.80
( 6.33) ( 2.06) ( 6.69) ( 6.74)
C1 -41.23 -104.05 -45.09 -45.67(-5.03) ( -4.62) ( -5.78) ( -6.07)
C2 -75.03 -78.78 -75.32 -73.15(-14.02) ( -4.49) (-14.49) (-14.58)
C3 -25.82 -7.55 -24.17 -23.00
(-4.00) ( -0.32) ( -3.87) ( -3.80)
C4 14.99 12.87 14.88 14.43
( 2.88) ( 0.86) ( 3.01) ( 3.04)
C5 15.30 56.45 17.54 18.04( 2.27) ( 1.77) ( 2.67) ( 2.81)
C6 -4.97 46.49 0.38 1.20(-0.91) ( 2.68) ( 0.07) ( 0.24)
C7 -28.15 -5.52 -26.23 -23.49(-4.57) ( -0.36) ( -4.49) ( -4.29)
C8 -18.24 -1.47 -17.08 -15.68
(-3.10) ( -0.09) ( -3.07) ( -2.97)
C9 -37.39 -37.52 -36.78 -35.09(-10.17) ( -3.55) (-10.51) (-10.45)
CIO -34.05 8.42 -29.64 -26.26(-5.23) ( 0.45) ( -4.72) ( -4.42)
ao 42.24 27.49 43.50 42.63(21.29) ( 3.38) ( 23.18) ( 22.64)
a, 0.21 0.25 0.20 0.21(13.57) ( 5.64) ( 14.40) ( 14.70)
TRIAL 53.54( 12.75)
0.39( 12.52)
No. Obs 3697 445 4142 4142
Log-likelihood 19591 2245 21875 21868
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cuit (Alabama, Georgia and Florida). This contrast reinforces the
Southern stereotype.
Another result is that o, the standard error of the unexplained
variation, increases with the average sentence (the parameter a has
a t-score in excess of 5 in all regressions). Furthermore, o" is about
the same for pleas and trials. For sentences of ten years, o equals 67
for pleas and 57 for trials; for sentences of fifteen years, o" is 80 for
pleas and 72 for trials; and for sentences of twenty-five years, the
values are 92 for pleas and 87 for trials. Although the conclusion is
necessarily tentative, it appears that a guilty plea results in a reduced
sentence, but otherwise does little to decrease the uncertainty of
sentences.' 6 This finding is surprising, because "reduction of un-
certainty" is often advanced to explain the preponderance of guilty
pleas in American court rooms.
One more pattern is notable. The difference between the esti-
mated trial and guilty plea structural models cannot be character-
ized by a shift in the intercept alone; that is, the introduction of a
variable to represent a guilty plea does not fully account for the dif-
ferent sentences received by those who enter a guilty plea and those
who are convicted by trial."7
Putting aside comparisons for the circuit dummy variables, pa-
rameter estimates derived from the regressions using only data from
cases with guilty pleas appear to be a fraction of their corresponding
values from the regressions using only data from cases with trials.
There are exceptions to this rule, but these exceptions are for vari-
ables that were not statistically significant in the trial regression;
16 This finding is subject to interpretation. Suppose that X (the vector of exogenous
variables) excludes variables that are known by the prosecution and defense to affect
sentencing, or suppose that J3X is an inadequate model specification, or both. Then 0 s
and aT are not so much reflections of the uncertainty facing the prosecution and defense
as they are indications of an inadequate model, and the interpretation given in the text
fails. Alternatively, assume that X includes all variables known by the prosecution and
defense to affect sentences, and that 13X is an adequate specification of the relationship
between X and the expected value of the sentence. Then the interpretation of as and aT,
as provided in the text, holds.
The model undoubtedly suffers from specification errors, and judicial decision mak-
ing certainly provides illustrations of idiosyncratic sentencing practices, so Os and rr
likely result from a combination of both factors. If idiosyncratic judicial decision making
is a significant part of the explanation, it is remarkable that as and cr are so close, imply-
ing-as stated in the text-that plea bargaining reduces uncertainty less than is com-
monly assumed. We should not attribute the size of the uncertainty completely to
judicial idiosyncracies, however.
17 Regressions one and two can be treated as the "unconstrained" model. Regres-
sion three is the "constrained" model that forces all parameters except the intercept to
be equated across the two regressions. We reject (at p < .001) the null hypothesis that
the slope coefficients are the same across the equations.
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thus, the exceptions might be attributed to the more precise para-
meter estimates for guilty pleas.' 8
Presuming that parameter estimates from the guilty plea regres-
sions are a constant multiple of the parameters from the trial regres-
sions, we estimated the fourth regression, which involved a
multiplier. Results are presented as column 5 of table 3.19 The re-
sulting model suggests that trials result in sentences that are
roughly 1.39 times larger than those resulting from guilty pleas.
IV. ANALYSIS-DRUG CASES
Drug law violators are a large and growing proportion of the
federal criminal case load.20 Combatting the drug scourge has be-
come a national priority. Both the Reagan and Bush administra-
tions have increased resources for combatting drug crimes, and, in
1986, Congress passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, which doubled the
mandatory minimum terms for most crimes of distribution, manu-
facturing and importation, and added enhancements to cover spe-
cial conditions (such as selling to minors). The Sentencing
Commission further increased the punishment for drug crimes by
making the guideline sentence following a conspiracy conviction
identical to the sentence following a conviction for the substantive
offense.2 1 Thus, statutory provisions for sentencing drug law viola-
tors have changed twice over the last five years, 22 with the expected
consequence of increasing the sentences for these crimes.
Federal drug law violations are conveniently categorized as in-
18 The accuracy of the parameter estimates increases with the size of the sample.
This increase in accuracy is reflected in the width of the confidence intervals for the
parameter estimates. Hence, we have more "confidence" in the regressions for guilty
pleas.
19 The multiplier model results in a value for minus the log-likelihood (21,868) that
is between the values for the two equation model (21,836) and the dummy variable
model (21,875). Although its explanatory power is less than the two-equation model,
parsimony recommends the multiplier model over the two equation alternative.
We estimated two additional versions of the multiplier model. In the first, we added
a constant term for trials. In the second, the multiplier term was a function of the cir-
cuit. Neither specification significantly improved the model's fit.
20 In 1981, 3,700 of 30,400 felony and serious misdemeanor cases involved drug law
violations as the most serious charge. As of 1985, 6,700 of 38,500 federal cases involved
drug law violations. Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Annual Report
of the Director, Table D-2 (1985).
21 The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 excluded conspiracy convictions from
mandatory minimum terms. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, P.L. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207.
22 In November 1988, President Reagan signed still another bill that increased the
minimum and maximum terms for drug law violations, extended minimum and maxi-
mum terms to new offenses such as possession under specified conditions, and added
collateral consequences such as loss of federal benefits. The analysis reported in this
paper predates the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, P.L. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181.
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volving opiates, cocaine, marijuana, and other controlled sub-
stances. We chose to examine cases of a single drug type: cocaine.
We included cases where the offense of conviction was conspiracy
and distribution. We excluded cases of possession, and cases where
the offense of conviction was the Continuing Criminal Enterprise, 23
the latter of which accounted for fewer than 100 cases per year.
Unlike bank robbery, cocaine-related crimes often differ from
their fictional counterparts portrayed on television. 24 Cocaine dis-
tribution may be conducted by a hierarchical structure, but often the
organization is small, and frequently, informal. We chose to ex-
amine cases where cocaine was distributed through an hierarchical
structure, and further limited our examination to offenders whose
roles were described as "leader" or "more culpable." This selec-
tion eliminated a large number of cases where the offender was
judged to be "equally culpable," "less culpable," a "worker," or
"acted alone." Prison terms are the predominant sentence for the
selected group.
Some distribution chains tend to specialize by drug type; others
deal with a spectrum of drugs. We selected for analysis those distri-
bution chains where only one drug-cocaine-was mentioned.
Within this selected group, we further distinguished offenses
based on the sophistication of the organization and the amount of
drugs that were distributed. We measured sophistication by
whether the offense was described as "ongoing and sophisticated,"
"multiple events, but unsophisticated," or "single act." We mea-
sured drug amount by the amount of pure cocaine distributed. Af-
ter some pretesting, a log-transformation of drug amount was found
to fit the data best. The probation officers who prepared
presentence investigation reports for these cases recorded the so-
phistication and drug amount; laboratory tests typically determined
the pure drug amount.
We limited the analysis to the twelve federal districts that prose-
cuted the largest volume of cocaine cases between January 1, 1984,
and the middle of 1988. Besides reducing the amount of data to
manageable size, focusing on these large districts afforded an exam-
23 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1988). Convictions under the Continuing Criminal Enterprise
(CCE) were not included, because CCE cases are qualitatively distinct from conspiracy
and distribution.
24 See P. ADLER, WHEELING AND DEALING (1985); S. Murphy, D. Waldorf & C.
Reinarman, Drifting into Dealing: Becoming a Cocaine Seller (NIJ Grant #7-0363-9-
CA-IJ, 1989); D. Waldorf, Final Report of the Ex-Sellers Project: An Exploratory Study
of Indirect Criminal Justice Pressures on Cocaine Sellers (NIJ Grant #89-IJ-CX-0036,
1989); M. Klein, C. Maxson & L. Cunningham, Gang Involvement in Cocaine "Rock
Trafficking" (NIJ Grant #85-IJ-LX-0057, 1988).
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ination of sentencing on the district level. Finally, for reasons dis-
cussed earlier, we excluded the records of a few hundred defendants
who were sentenced under the guidelines. A total of 2,829 cases
remained: 2,172 guilty pleas and 657 jury decisions.
Table 4
DEFINITIONS OF VARIABLES: DRUGS
PRISON* The maximum prison sentence imposed, coded in months. Life
terms are coded as 999. "Partial months" are coded as 0.5.
MULTIPLE "The current behavior was comprised of multiple acts, consisting
of a number of impulse or opportunity crimes (e.g. robberies
committed with little planning)" . . . from the coding instructions.
CONTINUE "The current behavior was comprised of multiple recurrent acts
that were planned as a long-range scheme" ... from the coding
instructions.
COKE The logarithm of the amount of drugs involved in the offense.
Drugs were measured as grams of pure cocaine.
T85... T88 Dummy variables representing the years 1985 through 1988; 1984
is the excluded year.
CONVICT The logarithm of the number of adult and juvenile convictions not
including the instant conviction of distributing cocaine. A one was
added to all variables prior to taking logarithms.
INCLOW The logarithm of the number of prior prison terms of between 30
days and one year. A one was added to all variables before taking
logarithms.
INC1-5 The logarithm of the number of prior prison terms of between 1
and 5 years. A one was added to all variables before taking
logarithms.
INC-5 The logarithm of the number of prior prison terms of more than
five years. A one was added to all variables before taking
logarithms.
PRIORS Number of prior convictions for this type of offense.
DI. .D12 Dummy variables coded one or zero depending on the district
where the defendant was convicted. District identities:
I New York Eastern











* As explained in the text, prison terms above 360 months were treated as being
censored at 360 months.
Variables are defined in table 4. Descriptive statistics appear in
table 5. Regression results are reported in table 6.






















































































prises. Prison terms are longer following convictions at trial than
they are following convictions by guilty plea. This difference might
be explained by the observation that more serious cases go to trial.
For example, trials tend to involve more sophisticated crimes and
larger quantities of drugs. A regression analysis is required to de-
termine whether crime seriousness alone accounts for these
differences.
According to Table 6, it appears that crime seriousness alone
cannot account for sentence differences. The regression for guilty
pleas (column 2) and the regression for trials (column 3) both indi-
cate that sentence severity increases with the sophistication of the
drug-distribution network (continuing) and with the amount of
drugs involved. Both indicate that severity has increased over time
(see variables T85-T88), although for trials, the trend does not
seem to extend into 1988.25 Both indicate large differences across
25 The trend toward more severe sentences appears to predate the Anti-Drug Abuse
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Table 6
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR PLEAS AND TRIALS: DRUGS
Guilty Plea Trial Both Multiplier
CONST 4.71 17.40 -2.91 0.18
1.21) ( 2.00) ( -0.77) ( 0.06)
CONTINUE 26.13 31.77 26.77 23.27
10.44) ( 5.46) ( 11.13) ( 11.29)
MULTIPLE 2.54 -4.86 1.85 1.02
1.23) ( -0.91) ( 0.95) ( 0.56)
COKE 6.91 9.57 7.57 7.08
18.28) ( 10.22) ( 21.87) ( 23.34)
T85 1.03 6.61 3.47 2.90
0.32) ( 0.99) ( 1.16) ( 1.14)
T86 1.86 16.90 4.70 5.34
0.65) ( 2.36) ( 1.75) ( 2.34)
T87 8.06 18.64 12.26 11.49
2.75) ( 2.48) ( 4.42) ( 4.89)
T88 21.98 7.20 18.67 16.77
5.73) ( 0.86) ( 5.59) ( 5.79)
CONVICT 4.71 -2.47 5.82 4.98
2.25) ( -0.42) ( 2.91) ( 2.77)
INCLOW -2.18 -6.39 -2.20 -2.44
(-0.57) ( -0.55) ( -0.60) ( -0.71)
INC 1-5 9.23 34.29 13.56 13.55
( 2.25) ( 2.75) ( 3.31) ( 3.64)
INC-5 14.96 75.23 25.16 23.91
( 2.40) ( 3.09) ( 3.61) ( 3.96)
PRIORS 9.32 15.74 9.65 9.26
( 3.05) ( 1.79) ( 3.22) ( 3.45)
Dl -18.06 -25.64 -18.94 -15.67
(-5.08) ( -3.39) ( -5.67) ( -5.33)
D2 -8.86 -5.51 -9.86 -6.97
(-2.87) ( -0.95) ( -3.52) ( -2.87)
D3 13.84 4.42 13.89 14.52
( 2.54) ( 0.31) ( 2.69) ( 3.04)
D4 -11.92 -19.61 -11.94 -10.66
(-3.60) ( -2.64) ( -3.81) ( -3.79)
D5 37.09 58.14 41.71 40.82
( 6.05) ( 2.93) ( 7.06) ( 7.57)
D6 3.97 53.02 11.63 15.12
( 1.04) ( 4.80) ( 3.03) ( 4.50)
D7 4.76 4.53 4.49 5.76
( 0.80) ( 0.45) ( 0.85) ( 1.27)
D8 3.88 17.86 4.97 8.85
( 0.89) ( 1.70) ( 1.21) ( 2.43)
D9 -16.13 49.16 -10.01 -10.11
(-3.92) ( 2.92) ( -2.34) ( -2.69)
DIO -24.75 -4.18 -22.19 -18.78
(-6.63) ( -0.37) ( -6.03) ( -5.53)
D11 -2.29 22.78 2.94 4.94
( -0.49) ( 1.72) ( 0.63) ( 1.21)
ao 22.33 5.53 24.01 23.27
( 10.18) ( 0.75) ( 13.11) ( 12.86)
a 0.47 0.54 0.43 0.43
( 13.43) ( 7.82) ( 17.12) ( 17.09)
TRIAL 42.16( 14.52)
0.61(14.17)
No. Obs 2172 657 2829 2829
Log-likelihood 10855 3511 14428 14408
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district courts in the sentences imposed on convicted drug dealers,
and while there are exceptions to the pattern, non-Southern dis-
tricts tend to impose sentences that are more lenient than those im-
posed in Southern districts.
Using the results from the regression reported in column 4
(which includes all pleas and trials, with a dummy variable to repre-
sent the occurrence of a trial), we reject the null hypothesis that
sentences are the same, except for a shift in the intercept, after trials
and pleas. We estimated a multiplier model. Results are reported
in column 5. Based on these results, a defendant convicted by trial
appears to receive a sentence that is roughly 61% larger than a simi-
larly situated defendant who pled guilty. 26
Once again, it is noteworthy that crs and aT are roughly the
same. For sentences of 60 months, the standard deviation for guilty
pleas is 50; for trials, it is 38. For sentences of 120 months, the
values are 79 and 70; for 180 months, they are 107 and 103; for 240
months, 135 and 135. Although findings are tentative because esti-
mates of o- cannot be attributed exclusively to judicial sentencing
idiosyncracies, plea bargaining appears to do little to reduce the un-
certainty of sentencing.
V. SENTENCE DisPARrr
Expanding upon our earlier working definition, a sentence is
disparate when (1) two defendants who are identical in all ways that
should affect the sentence nevertheless receive different sentences,
or (2) two defendants who are identical except for one or more fac-
tors that should affect the sentence receive the same sentence, or (3)
a sentence is imposed that is too severe or is too lenient given ac-
cepted sentencing criteria. This definition may be thus illustrated:
(1) Two first-time offenders with identical backgrounds rob banks
under the identical set of circumstances. The first offender enters a
guilty plea and receives a fifteen year term, while the second enters a
guilty plea and receives a twenty-five year term.
(2) Two first-time offenders with identical backgrounds rob banks
under identical circumstances, except that the first offender displays a
firearm while the second offender is unarmed. Both offenders receive
twenty year prison terms.
See supra note 21. Few of these offenders would have been convicted prior to 1987, yet
sentence severity increases before that date.
26 Based on a likelihood ratio test, the model with a shift parameter was rejected at p
< .001. The multiplier model was also rejected at p < .001. However, parsimony
seems to recommend the multiplier model, for which minus the log-likelihood (14,408)
was intermediate between that recorded for the unconstrained model (14,366) and the
dummy variable model (14,428).
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(3) A repeat offenders robs a bank, discharges a firearm in the direc-
tion of a teller, and pistol-whips the guard. The offender receives a
two year term of probation.
One notable feature of this definition is that its application requires
an explicit sentencing standard. For example, illustrations (1) and
(2) require qualitative standards for what variables should and should
not be taken into account during sentencing, and illustration (3) re-
quires a quantitative standard for how much each factor should affect
the sentence.
To tie this working definition into the statistical analysis, it is
useful to revisit the statistical model, which can be summarized as:
T = 13o + f31X 1 + 132X2 + . .. + 13.X. +
U = a0 + al(130 + 131XI + 0 2X2 + ... + 1.Xn)
where the Xs represent variables taken into account by sentencing
judges and e is a random error term with no observable counterpart.
We are able to estimate the 13s, the quantitative effect of each ex-
planatory variable, and or, the amount of unexplained sentencing
variation.
Which of these parameters measures disparity? It is seductive
to examine the residual variance 02, note that it is large relative to
mean sentence imposed, and conclude that sentence disparity in the
federal courts was rampant prior to sentencing guidelines (which
took effect after these data were collected) 27 Indeed, sentence dis-
parity may have been rampant, but for a number of reasons, 28 this
27 The guidelines were in effect after November 1987. However, the guidelines ap-
plied only to offenders who committed their crimes after November, 1987, and some-
what more than half the district court judges found the guidelines unconstitutional.
Consequently, few defendants had been sentenced under the guidelines during the time
covered by this analysis.
28 First, although our model is more general than models usually employed to study
sentencing practices, there is no guarantee that the model's specification is correct. If
the model is not linear-additive, as we have assumed, misspecification will be reflected in
the residual term, and "disparity" may be nothing more than inadequate model specifi-
cation.
Second, although our data provide rich descriptions of the offense and the offender,
there is no guarantee that we have included all the variables considered by ajudge at the
time of sentencing. "Disparity" may be nothing more than omitted variables that ap-
pear as a large residual.
Third, there is a fundamental problem with equating residual variation to disparity.
Assuming a sentencing standard, suppose that the X vector can be decomposed into two
parts: factors that are legitimate when used during sentencing (L) and factors that are
not legitimate (I). Similarly, 13 can be decomposed into two corresponding parts: the
quantitative importance of legitimate components (13L) and the quantitative importance
of illegitimate components (131). Disparity can be said to exist when 013=0, because de-
fendants, who are identical on all factors that should affect sentencing, receive different
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conclusion is necessarily tentative.
Subject to appropriate caveats, however, the regression of T on
X produces parameter estimates that can be used to draw inferences
about sentence disparity. Before these inferences can be drawn, we
must distinguish between factors that have a legitimate role (L) at
the time of sentencing and those factors that do not (I).
Here is the problem for a social scientist: there exists no clearly
defined standard distinguishing L from I. Consequently, there is
considerable ambiguity when drawing conclusions about sentence
disparity.
How does one find a standard? The regression equation itself
might be said to "reveal" an implicit "standard" in the form of "typ-
ical" decision making. Unfortunately, this approach begs the ques-
tion. For example, if Blacks receive longer sentences than
Caucasians, should we assume that race is a legitimate factor at the
time of sentencing? If repeat offenders receive extended prison
terms, should we presume that the sentence is optimal from the
standpoint of deterrence? incapacitation? rehabilitation? There is
no compelling reason for treating a regression equation as a re-
vealed standard.
The general search may be quixotic, but for the federal courts,
Congress has mandated the Sentencing Commission to be the stan-
dard setter. This observation suggests a test for sentence disparity:
Offenders who were sentenced in the past should be categorized ac-
cording to variables that the Sentencing Commission has deemed
appropriate for sentencing. Following this classification, descriptive
statistics can be estimated for sentences within each category. The
extent to which "old" sentences depart from "new standards" can
be a measure of disparity.2 9 An overview of sentencing guidelines,
as they apply to bank robbery and cocaine distribution, appears in
the next section.
sentences based on factors that should not influence sentencing decisions. Disparity
can also be said to exist when 13L=0 , because defendants who are different on a factor
that should be considered at the time of sentencing nevertheless receive the same
sentences. Even a non-zero estimate for O3L may indicate disparity if 13 L differs from an
accepted standard. Thus, sentence disparity may be reflected by variation that is ac-
counted for by the regression but attributed to illegitimate factors (the explained varia-
tion) as well as by variation that is not accounted for by the regression (unexplained
variation).
29 A problem with this test is that the standard is a moving target; namely, whatever
the Sentencing Commission deems to be the guideline sentence at any point in time.
That the Commission has already modified its guidelines several times since 1987 points




Figure I provides a summary of bank robbery and drug sales
sentencing guidelines, as these were promulgated in 1987.30 In op-
eration, the "levels" and "points" referenced by the guidelines are
totaled separately, and a sentencing grid (with offense seriousness
levels on one axis and criminal history points on the other) specifies
a mandatory sentencing range. An abbreviated version of the sen-
tencing grid, which actually has forty-three levels, appears as Figure
2.
The Crime Control Act of 1984 abolished parole,31 so
sentences imposed pursuant to the guidelines are equivalent to time
to be served, subject only to a fifteen percent reduction for good-
time. The sentencing grid provides a range within which the judge
can impose a sentence; any sentence within this range can be im-
posed. Judges can depart from this range, but only for cause, and
most departures can be appealed by the defense and the
government.
As an illustration, the bank robbery guidelines set a base level
of 18 for a defendant who robs a single bank and steals less than
$2,500. If the defendant was unarmed, caused no injury, did not
take hostages (Figure I does not report provisions for injury and
hostages), and had no prior criminal record, then the level 18 score
would result in the defendant serving between 27 and 33 months,
not counting any earned good-time. If the defendant's criminal rec-
ord resulted in a criminal history score of 13 points or more, he or
she would serve 57-71 months, not counting good-time. Enhance-
ments to the offense seriousness level increase time served by a
compound rate of roughly 12.5% per level. A criminal history score
of 2 or 3 points increases the sentence by 27%, a score of 4 to 6
points increases it by 42%, a score of 7 to 9 points increases it by
60%, a score of 10 to 12 points increases it by 80%, and a score of
13 or more increases it by 103%.
B. GUILTY PLEAS-DISPARITY OR ADMINISTRATIVE NECESSITY?
Plea bargaining, a process that is only remotely related to the
30 Figure 1 excludes some guideline provisions for bank robbery and drug sales,
paraphrases the provisions that are included, and omits details that are important when
applying the guidelines. Nevertheless, this simplified representation of the guidelines
that appears in Figure I is adequate for our purposes-comparing results from the sta-
tistical analysis with the standards established by the guidelines.
31 Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, P.L. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987, ch. II.





SELECTED PROVISIONS OF THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES
Bank Robbery
Assign a base offense level of 18
If the value of the property taken or destroyed exceeded $2,500, increase the
offense level as follows: 1 level for $2,501-$10,000; 2 levels for $10,001-$50,000; 3
levels for $50,000-$250,000; 4 levels for $250,000-$1,000,000; 5 levels for
$1,000,000-$5,000,000; and 6 levels for more than $5,000,001.
If a firearm was discharged, increase by 5 levels, if a firearm or a dangerous weapon
was otherwise used, increase by 4 levels, if a firearm or other dangerous weapon
was brandished, displayed or possessed, increase by 3 levels.
Add 2 levels if two banks were robbed; add 3 levels if three banks were robbed; add
4 levels if four to five banks were robbed; and add 5 levels if more than 5 banks
were robbed.
Distribution of Cocaine
For distribution of cocaine, the offense level is determined by the amount of drugs
involved: 0-25 grams, level 12; 25-49 grams, level 14; 50-99 grams, level 16; 100-
199 grams, level 18, 200-299 grams, level 20; 300-399 grams, level 22; 400-499
grams, level 24; 0.5-1.9 kilograms, level 26; 2-3.4 kilograms, level 32; 15-49.9
kilograms, level 34; 50 kilograms or more, level 36.
For multiple offenses, add all drug amounts together before applying the above
rules.
Guidelines Common to Both Offenses
Based on the role in the offense, increase the offense level by 4 if the defendant was
an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more participants,
by 3 levels if the defendant was a manager or supervisor (but not an organizer or a
leader) and the criminal activity involved five or more participants, and by 2 levels if
the defendant was an organizer, leader, manager or supervisor in any other
criminal activity.
Based on the role in the offense, decrease the offense level by 4 levels if the
defendant was a minimal participant and by 2 levels if the defendant was a minor
participant.
If the defendant clearly demonstrates a recognition and affirmative acceptance of
personal responsibility for the offense of conviction, reduce the offense level by 2
levels.
Criminal History Score
To construct the criminal history score, add 3 points for each prior offense of
imprisonment exceeding one year and one month, add 2 points for each prior
sentence of imprisonment of at least sixty days but less than one year and one
month, add 1 point for each other prior sentence (up to"4 points); add 2 points if
the defendant committed the instant offense while under any criminal justice
sentence; add 2 points if the defendant committed the instant offense less than two
years after release from prison.
Source: October 1987 Guidelines Manual issued by the U.S. Sentencing





GUIDELINES SENTENCING GRID (ABBREVIATED)
criminal history points




18 27-33 30-37 41 41-51 51-63 57-71
33- 37-
19 30-37 41 46 46-57 57-71 63-78
33- 37-
20 41 46 41-51 51-63 63-78 70-87
37-
21 46 41-51 46-57 57-71 70-87 77-96
22 41-51 46-57 51-63 63-78 77-96 84-105
Notes: The sentencing grid contains 43 offense levels. The lower levels provide
for sentences to probation; the highest levels provide for life sentences. In this
abbreviated version, the grid provides only for determinate terms of incarceration.
To determine a sentence, the offense level is computed based on the offense com-
mitted, the criminal history point total is computed based on the offender's crimi-
nal record, and the sentence range is determined by the intersection of the offense
level and the criminal history points. For example, an offense level of 20 and a
criminal history point score of 5 would require a prison term between 41 and 51
months.
magnitude of the crime and the defendant's culpability, is a major
determinant of the sentence imposed. The guidelines contain an
"acceptance of responsibility" provision, which might be expected
to make sentences following conviction at trial approximately 27%
longer than sentences imposed after acceptance of a guilty plea.3 2
Prior to the guidelines, defendants convicted at trial could ex-
pect to receive sentences that were 61% (cocaine) to 39% (robbery)
longer than sentences expected by defendants who entered guilty
pleas. The guidelines, through the "acceptance of responsibility"
provision, contemplate a sentence that is about 27% higher for de-
fendants who are convicted by trial than for defendants who pled
guilty. The guidelines further allow unlimited sentence concessions
in exchange for substantial cooperation with the government re-
garding other criminal cases.
Whether such extreme sentence variation should be allowed in
32 Defendants who enter a guilty plea do not by right receive credit for acceptance of
responsibility; nor are defendants who are convicted by trial precluded from receiving
the 2-level adjustment. Nevertheless, Commission deliberations were consistent with an
expectation that the acceptance of responsibility provision was seen as a substitute for
sentence concessions for plea bargains. In addition, the Commission provided for sen-
tencing below the guideline minimum when the defendant provided substantial assist-
ance to the government in a criminal prosecution.
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a "just" sentencing system is arguable. The guideline drafters' am-
bivalence about this debate is reflected in the guidelines' acceptance
of responsibility provision, which provides for a sentence conces-
sion not because the defendant entered a guilty plea, but rather be-
cause he admitted and accepted responsibility for his crime.
Although there is a shade of difference between "admitting respon-
sibility" and "entering a plea of guilty," in practice the shade is not
a dark one, and the acceptance of responsibility provision is princi-
pally a politically more palatable alternative to a guideline provision
that would more directly reward defendants for entering guilty
pleas.33
The plea bargaining debate has many facets. Among these is
the question of how large sentence concessions must be to induce a
sufficient number of defendants to enter guilty pleas rather than go
to trial. Our statistical analysis provides a tentative answer to this
question.
Tables 3 and 6 reveal marked differences in sentences across
circuits (robbery) and districts (drugs). These tables also reveal that
sentences are more severe for defendants convicted by trial than for
defendants who pled guilty. These two observations lead to a ques-
tion: Do inter-circuit (inter-district) differences in sentence conces-
sions affect the probability of a trial?
To answer this question, we used the regressions on guilty
pleas and trials to compute the predicted sentence following a trial
(ST) and following a guilty plea (SP) for every defendant, regardless
of how he was actually convicted. We interpreted the resulting sta-
33 Preliminary drafts of the guidelines used language that more directly recognized a
need to exchange sentence concessions for guilty pleas. Such wording was objection-
able to many outside the Commission, especially certain federal judges, who found the
acceptance of responsibility provision to be more acceptable. Nevertheless, the accept-
ance of responsibility provision continued to be seen by the Commission as a surrogate
means to induce guilty pleas, and much internal debate at the Commission was about
whether the acceptance of responsibility provision would be adequate or whether some
other concessions were necessary. The Commission was intentionally vague in its provi-
sions for plea bargaining, partly because the Commissioners could not agree about the
role of plea bargaining under a system of guidelines, partly because they were uncertain
about how plea bargaining would actually operate under the guidelines. Once the
guidelines were implemented, some Commissioners argued that the acceptance of re-
sponsibility provision was as much leverage as the government could legitimately exer-
cise; other Commissioners held (and promoted) the position that all elements
recognized under the guidelines were negotiable by the prosecution and defense. From
the former view, for example, when a gun was used during a robbery, that fact must be
used by the sentencing judge when imposing sentence; from the latter view, the prose-
cution could stipulate that no gun was used, in which case it would not be factored into
the guidelines. These insights are from the author's personal observations while Direc-
tor of Research at the United States Sentencing Commission. See also SENTENCING COM-
MISSION, SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 49.
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tistic, C = SP/ST, as an indication of the concession that a defendant
expects to receive for a guilty plea. We used ST and C as explana-
tory variables in a logit regression with conviction by trial as the
dependent variable. Furthermore, we included the predicted value
of the sentence following trial, ST, because of evidence that the
most serious crimes were most likely to lead to trials.
For robbery, the regression results were:
-3.88 +0.0045ST + 1.19C
(-15.37) (7.16) (5.00)




These results imply two conclusions. First, the probability of a
trial increases with the size of the sentence that is expected to be
imposed following conviction at trial. Second, the probability of a
trial decreases with the size of the concession received following a
guilty plea. In quantitative terms, the derivative of the probability of
a trial, when evaluated at the mean for the independent variables,
equals:
robber: aP/aST = 0.0052
P/ac = 0.0011
drugs: OP/OST = 0.013
aP/0C = 0.000086
where ST is measured as years and C as a .01 change in the indicator
of a sentence concession. Although there is no absolute standard
for "big" or "small" changes, these derivatives suggest that the de-
mand for trials is inelastic with respect to the size of the plea bargain
concession. Put another way, the analysis produces considerable ev-
idence that defendants receive sentence concessions following a
guilty plea, but very little evidence to indicate that a defendant's
propensity to enter a guilty plea is sensitive to the size of these sen-
tence concessions. Perhaps this insensitivity is an explanation for
why reform programs that abolish plea bargaining have seldom re-
sulted in large, permanent increases in the incidence of trials.3 4
That the admission of guilt is so insensitive to the size of the
34 M. TONRY, supra note 2.
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sentence concession exchanged for a guilty plea-raises the question:
Should the sentencing guidelines provide for large sentence conces-
sions that are unrelated to the magnitude of the crime and the de-
fendant's criminal record without a compelling administrative
necessity? Our observations are that sentence concessions prior to
the guidelines were large, that sentence concessions anticipated
under the guidelines are not much smaller, and that the administra-
tive necessity of such large sentence concessions may be lacking.
Studies by the Sentencing Commission, which have been prom-
ised but are not yet forthcoming, are imperative for answering this
question. For now, we conclude that under the guidelines-as was
true under preguideline practices-defendants who enter guilty
pleas will serve markedly shorter terms than will similarly situated
defendants who are convicted at trial.
C. PREGUIDELINE SENTENCES COMPARED TO THE GUIDELINES
Beyond plea bargaining, past sentencing practices can be com-
pared to the standard set by the guidelines. This comparison re-
quires three steps: using results from the regression analysis to
compute the sentence typically imposed on defendants who have
specific characteristics, determining time to be served as stipulated
by the guidelines for the same defendants, and comparing the two.
According to the regression results for bank robbery, a first-
time offender who was unarmed, who acted alone, and who stole
$8,000 from a single bank could expect to receive a sentence of
somewhat more than five years.3 5 Given extant parole guidelines
and good-time provisions, this offender could expect to serve 28 to
35 months.36 The original sentencing guidelines required a term of
between 30 and 37 months, exclusive of good-time; thus, the sen-
tence required by the original guidelines appears to be consistent
with preguideline sentences, at least for the type of offender and
offense described in this paragraph.
According to the regression results, possession of a weapon in-
creased the sentence by 21% for those convicted by trial and by
27% for those who entered a guilty plea. Brandishing or otherwise
using a weapon increased the sentence by 28% to 38%. In compari-
son, under the guidelines, the weapon enhancement is between
27% and 54%, depending on how the weapon was used.3 7 Regard-
35 All variables other than those mentioned were set at their average values when
making these calculations.
36 SENTENCING COMMISSION, SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT, supra note 1, ch. 4.
37 Each level increase in the guidelines increases the time to be served by about
12.5%. We computed the sentence enhancement attributable to the guidelines as 1.125
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ing sentence enhancement for possession and use of a weapon,
preguideline practices are roughly consistent with the standards
contemplated by the guidelines.
According to the regression results, robbers who were judged
to be "more culpable" received terms that were 5% to 10% longer
(following trials and guilty pleas) than those judged "equally culpa-
ble" or "acting alone." The guidelines call for a 27% sentence en-
hancement, so preguideline practices were more lenient. According
to the regression results, robbers judged "less culpable" received
sentences that were 32% to 35% shorter than those judged "equally
culpable" or "acting alone." Under the guidelines, the, reduction
would be 27% to 60%, depending on whether the defendant was
determined to be a "minimal" or a "minor" participant. Regarding
the offender's role in the offense, preguideline practices were
roughly consistent with the standard set by the guidelines.
According to the results from the regressions, two prior convic-
tions that had not resulted in prison terms would be expected to
increase the current sentence by 14% to 15% (trials and pleas); two
prior convictions that both resulted in prison terms would be ex-
pected to increase the current sentence by 29% to 47%o, depending
on other assumptions. The guidelines require a sentence enhance-
ment of about 13% for two prior convictions that did not result in
prison, and between 27% and 42% for two prior convictions that
both resulted in prison terms that exceeded one year. Although the
guidelines again appear to be consistent with preguideline sentenc-
ing practices, the guidelines contain a career offender provision38
requiring that defendants who have two prior convictions for con-
trolled substance offenses or violent crimes must serve no fewer
than 70 months and may be required to serve as many as 327
months, depending on the offenders' prior criminal records and the
statute under which they are convicted. Many bank robbers will
qualify for application of this provision,3 9 so the guidelines' criminal
history provisions are likely to be more severe for repeat offenders
than was true of preguideline sentencing practices.
According to the regression results, a second bank robbery is
likely to increase the prison term by 28% to 44% depending on
raised to the power of L, where L is the number of level adjustments stipulated by the
guidelines. Other guideline effects reported in this section were computed similarly.
38 The career offender provision was required by the Crime Control Act of 1984. 28
U.S.C. § 994(h) (1988). The Commission determined how this provision would be ap-
plied, however.
39 Block & Rhodes, Forecasting the Impact of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 7 BEHAV.
ScI. & L. 51 (1989).
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whether the offenses are described as "multiple" or "continuing."
Under the guidelines, the increase would be about 27%, so the
guidelines might be seen as being somewhat more lenient toward
multiple offenses.
For bank robbery cases, then, federal judges appear to have
taken into account the same factors prior to the guidelines as they
are required to take into account by the guidelines. Furthermore,
the relative weights associated with each factor prior to the guide-
lines is roughly similar, although far from identical, to the weights
assigned by the guidelines.
For drug law violations, comparisons are less useful because the
minimum sentences mandated by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986
forced the Sentencing Commission to establish guideline sentences
that departed from preguideline practices. According to the regres-
sion results, a first-time offender who sold 879 grams of pure co-
caine (the average weight in these data and roughly a kilogram of
packaged cocaine) would be sentenced to 100 months following
conviction at trial. He would be eligible for parole after serving
one-third of this sentence, and given prevailing release practices of
the United States Parole Commission, he could expect to serve
about 33 to 41 months.40 Under the guidelines, the sentence range
is 78 to 121 months exclusive of gobd-time, assuming that the 879
grams are not heavily diluted.4 1 The guidelines require prison
terms that are markedly longer than preguideline sentences. 42
According to the regressions, an offender with two prior convic-
tions, neither of which had resulted in a prison term, would receive
no more than a marginal sentence enhancement based on his crimi-
nal record. Under the guidelines, the sentence enhancement would
be about 27%. According to the regressions, an offender with two
prior convictions, both of which had resulted in prison terms, would
receive a sentence that is considerably longer than the sentence of a
first-time offender. Under the guidelines, the difference would be
about 27% to 42%.
D. DISPARITY
Although the comparisons are necessarily crude, the regression
analysis seems to contain most of the factors that the Sentencing
Commission has deemed "legitimate" considerations for purposes
40 SENTENCING COMMISSION, SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT, supra note 1, chap. 4.
41 The guidelines' sentence is based on bulk weight, rather than pure weight, but a
near kilogram of cocaine is unlikely to be diluted more than about 10o.
42 Block & Rhodes, supra note 39.
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of sentencing. Furthermore, for bank robbery, the quantitative im-
portance of those factors taken into account in the past are not
greatly different from the weights stipulated by the guidelines.
Drug law violators will receive prison sentences that are higher
under the guidelines than during the preguideline period, primarily
because the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 stipulated increased
mandatory minimum terms based on the amount of drugs sold and
the conditions under which the drugs were sold.
With this observation made, some conclusions can be drawn.
First, although specification error and omitted variables undoubt-
edly account for some of the unmeasured variation, the data include
variables recognized by the Sentencing Commission as legitimate
factors to be used at the time of sentencing, and the linearity as-
sumption is consistent with the sentencing guidelines.
Thus, these are rich data, 43 and a linear-additive form is likely
to capture most of the systematic variation in sentence imposed.
Yet the unexplained variation-which must be attributable primar-
ily44 to factors that should not be taken into account during sentenc-
ing-is large. For bank robbery, a is about eight years for robbers
who as a group receive average terms of twenty-five years; for drug-
law violations, o" is about ten years for dealers who as a group re-
ceive average terms of twenty years. Given the standard that is im-
plicit in the discretionary 25% range allowed under the guidelines
(a provision of the Crime Control Act of 1984 and reflected in the
43 Using a smaller but more detailed data set, the Sentencing Commission, in chapter
four of its SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT ON THE INITIAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES (see supra note
1), found other variables that affected the sentencing decision: degree of planning in-
volved, hostages taken, degree of injury inflicted by the defendant's accomplice, and
whether the defendant earned most of his income from crime. We excluded all cases
with injury and all cases involving hostages from our data, so these factors cannot affect
the analysis. The absence of the other two variables-degree of planning and defend-
ant's income-appear as part of the residual, but neither had a large effect in the Sen-
tencing Commission's statistical model. For drug law violations, the Commission
reported that additional variables affect the sentence imposed: weapon present or used,
cooperation with authorities, defendant was drug user, defendant imported the drug,
and defendant's income came primarily from crime. Some of these variables are ex-
pected to have little importance for large cocaine distribution schemes, but others would
have increased the model's explanatory power somewhat.
44 The guidelines recognize several explicit, special conditions, such as extreme psy-
chological injury to a victim, for which the judge may depart from the guidelines. These
special conditions may have occurred during the crimes that resulted in the cases that
comprised our data, where they would partly account for the unexplained residual varia-
tion. Based on qualitative and quantitative analysis, the Commission concluded that
such special conditions were rare, which was why those conditions were not incorpo-
rated explicitly as elements of the guidelines. Such rare events could not explain much
of the unexplained variation in these regressions.
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sentencing grid), sentences imposed during the preguideline period
diverged greatly from standards of equal justice.
Furthermore, the regional and district variation is large. An ar-
gument can be made that a sentencing standard should afford wide
regional variation, allowing as a matter of political expression a con-
servative South to impose harsher sentences than a liberal North.
The Sentencing Commission has rejected such a district-specific
standard. Consequently, our statistics provide strong evidence of
disparate sentencing across the nation's federal courts during the
mid-1980s prior to the introduction of sentencing guidelines.
The unexplained residual undoubtedly contains a mixture of
systematic variation that could be attributed to unwarranted factors
(e.g., age, sex, race) that were not included in our analysis, judicial
idiosyncracy, and pure random chance. How the unexplained
residual should be divided among these factors is unknown, but we
doubt that age, sex and race (factors that have much interested
other researchers) explain much of the unmeasured variation. Ear-
lier analyses conducted at the Sentencing Commission and separate
analysis by Rhodes and Conly45 generally found no strong effects
attributable to race or age; gender effects were somewhat stronger,
but for the two crimes examined here, men predominate. Rhodes
and Conly reported that the unemployed are sentenced to longer
terms than the employed, and the Sentencing Commission 46 re-
ported thatjudges sentence defendants who derive their income pri-
marily from crime more severely than those who have alternative
legitimate income sources. Our data did not provide these vari-
ables, so we conclude that they are part of the residual term, but
certainly not a large part of that residual.
Aside from variation in regional perspectives, we feel that sen-
tence disparity has not resulted from biased judges imposing unac-
ceptable sentences based on illegitimate factors; rather, disparity
seems to have resulted from well-intentioned judges making indi-
vidualistic decisions in a setting almost devoid of principle, struc-
ture, and regularity. Whether the federal Sentencing Guidelines
Commission can further articulate the principles that should guide
judges when sentencing and provide the structure for consistent
sentencing is a question of pressing policy significance.
VI. SUMMARY
This paper presents a statistical model of sentencing that em-
45 Rhodes & Conly, supra note 6.
46 SENTENCING COMMISSION, SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 39.
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phasizes the average sentences imposed after guilty pleas and trials
as well as the variation about those averages. Especially notable in
this statistical model is the explicit specification of a random coeffi-
cient model, which has a strong justification when analyzing sen-
tencing data. The specification provides an improved measure of
sentence dispersion, a statistic that is important to measuring sen-
tence disparity.
The utility of this model has been demonstrated using data
about bank robbery and cocaine-distribution. We used the model to
draw conclusions about sentence disparity. Regarding plea bargain-
ing, we noted that sentence concessions in exchange for a guilty
plea are statistically significant and might be considered large. We
uncovered only scant evidence that the frequency of guilty pleas in-
creases or decreases with variation in the size of these concessions.
Regarding sentence disparity, we concluded tentativelym-subject to
numerous caveats-that preguideline disparity might be considered
to be a major problem in federal courts. Whether the recently intro-





Interest centers on estimating and comparing the conditional
mean and standard deviation for sentences imposed after trials and
after guilty pleas. Our approach required four steps: (1) using data
from trials only, we estimated a regression equation with prison
time as the dependent variable; (2) next, using data from guilty
pleas only, we repeated the first regression; (3) we then combined
the trial and plea data, added a dummy variable to represent occur-
rence of a trial, and estimated a third regression; and (4) after re-
placing the dummy variable with a multiplier term to account for
differences between sentences following trials and guilty pleas, we
estimated a fourth regression.
To explain the regression technique, let:
T prison time imposed by the court
T* a latent variable
X a vector of exogenous variables.
13 a parameter vector, conformable with X
a parameters with subscripts 0 and 1.
or standard error
T* = D1X + e where e--N(0,u)
T = T* if T* >0andT* <360
T = 0 if T* < 0
T = 360 ifT* > 360
Ur = cto + cX(13X)
The lower limit applies because prison terms cannot be less than
0.4 7 The upper limit applies because sentences above 30 years have
a maximum parole eligibility of ten years, and hence, sentences
greater than thirty years have mostly symbolic significance.
The residual is heteroscedastic with a standard error that in-
creases with the value of the latent variable. This specification-
which is a significant feature of this model-results from an assump-
tion that judges sentence according to a structural model T* = BX
+ u, but that each judge selects B from a random vector whose ele-
ments are normally, independently, and identically distributed with
47 Alternatively, we could have used a sequential equation model, Heckman, Sample
Selection Bias as a Specification Error, 47 ECONOMETRICA 153 (1979), or a switching regres-
sion, G. MADDALA, supra note 8, as suggested by Klepper, Nagin & Tierney, Discrimination
in the Criminal Justice System: A Critical Appraisal of the Literature, in RESEARCH ON SENTENC-
INC: THE SEARCH FOR REFORM (A. Blumstein, J. Cohen, S. Martin & M. Tonry eds.
1983). Although the Heckman approach has a stronger theoretical justification than the
approach taken here, it requires a priori identification conditions that could not be met.
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a mean vector of 13; u is normally distributed with a mean of 0. Then
E is normally distributed with a standard deviation equal to
(cto+cc1 X (3X)) 1'2 . In fact, we eventually assumed that
a =ao+ ct X (3X), which fit the data better based on the value of the
likelihood function.
How to model judicial sentencing behavior is a subject that has
been addressed by Rich et al. ,48 among others. Rich has argued that
not all judges sentence according to the same structural model, and
consequently, a regression equation does not truly reflect judicial
decision making. Our approach, which uses slope coefficients that
vary across sentencing decisions, is more general than the approach
criticized by Rich. As a result, this statistical model is closer to real-
ity49 and less subject to the criticisms raised by Rich and
colleagues. 50
Developing a model that recognizes heterogeneity in judicial
decision making, and hence a heteroscedastic error term, increases
confidence in the parameter estimates of the 03, because limited de-
pendent variable models are subject to bias when error terms are
erroneously modeled as homoscedastic. 51 Furthermore, the specifi-
cation provides a more robust measure of sentence dispersion, a sta-
tistic that is crucially important to measuring sentence disparity.
48 W. RICH, supra note 1.
49 Based on our experience working with federal judges, to us it seems realistic to
assume that judges disagree about the weights that should be given to different factors
when sentencing convicted defendants, while these same judges agree generally about
the factors that mitigate and aggravate sentences. Nevertheless, the assumption is testa-
ble by conventional significance tests on the parameter a,.
50 A criticism raised by Klepper, supra note 47, and others is that the tobit model
requires that identical factors affect both the judicial decision to sentence to prison and
the length of time to be incarcerated; furthermore, parameters from the tobit model are
required to have the same weights in both of these decisions. Many researchers view
these assumptions as being so restrictive as to make the tobit model unsuitable for the
analysis of sentencing practices.
An alternative to the tobit model is to first estimate the probability of a prison sen-
tence and then estimate the length of time to be served after correcting for selection
bias, Heckman, supra note 47. Although this more general model has appeal, it requires
restrictive identification conditions: Variables that affect the imposition of a prison sen-
tence cannot affect the decision about the length of prison time imposed. This restric-
tion must be based on theory; it cannot be tested through the analysis, because a
misspecified model will yield biased parameter estimates, hence invalidating the test of
the null hypothesis. Theory is typically inadequate to support such a priori restrictions.
Nevertheless, the "bifurcated model" of sentencing (as the above approach is
known) is frequently used for the analysis of sentencing decisions. Researchers who use
the bifurcated approach should note that our discussion of heteroscedasticity remains
valid for the bifurcated approach: parameter estimates will be biased absent a correction
for heteroscedasticity. Additionally, using a multiplier to model the effects of plea bar-
gaining can be applied when using the bifurcated approach.
51 G. MADDALA, supra note 8.
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This model is easily extended to include a multiplier:
T* = (l+,r)tI3X + e
a = ct0 + ctIX((I+'r) t[3x)
where t equals one when a trial occurs and equals zero otherwise.
In effect, this model assumes that sentences following a trial are a
multiple (1 +r) of sentences following a guilty plea.
Using maximum likelihood techniques, the regressions were es-
timated by an iterative technique programmed in GAUSS. We per-
formed limited pretesting. Instead, when specifying our model, we
relied on earlier analysis of similar data sets, 52 expert opinions
about factors that currently enter into sentencing practices,53 and an
assumption that the model was additive. Of course, there is no
guarantee that the resulting specification is correct.
We examined the data for collinearity. Using singular-value de-
composition methods, we concluded that multicollinearity was not a
serious problem.54
Using White's test for heteroscedastic error terms, we con-
cluded that heteroscedasticity was a problem. Our approach to
overcoming this problem has been discussed.
52 SENTENCING COMMISSION, SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT, supra note 1.
53 UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL (1988).
54 Such an approach is necessarily subjective. See D. BELSLEY, E. KUH & R. WELSCH,
REGRESSION DIAGNOSTICS (1980).
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